

Agrarian Transformation and Colonialism: An Historical-Comparative Study of Korea and the Philippines

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This study compares the development of South Korea, a relatively successful case in East Asia, with the underdevelopment of the Philippines. We examine the internal class dynamics and external world economic forces that shaped capitalist development in Korea and the Philippines. The comparative analysis reveals that the structural transformation in agriculture, and rural class relations, were critical to the divergent paths of development of these two Asian countries.

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Introduction

In recent years, the regions of East and Southeast Asia have attracted the interests of scholars engaged in the study of development and underdevelopment. Of particular interest have been the newly industrializing countries (the NICs) in East Asia--South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. These countries, known as the "four little dragons," have achieved unprecedented socioeconomic changes leading to industrial capitalism (Berger and Hsiao, 1988; Cheng and Haggard, 1987; Deyo, 1987; White, 1988).

This study compares the development of South Korea, a relatively successful case in East Asia, with the underdevelopment of the Philippines. Several studies have attempted to explain industrial capitalist development in South Korea and underdevelopment in the Philippines. Among the determinants of economic development in South Korea that have been identified are the interventionist role of the strong state (Burmeister, 1986; 1990; Koo, 1987; Rhce, Ross-Larson, and Purcell, 1984), close and dynamic business-government relations, access to adequate foreign capital, and cultural and psychological factors (Kim, 1988). Explanations of underdevelopment in the Philippines include the heterogeneity in racial and cultural composition of the population; socio-political unrest, especially the armed insurgency of Muslim minority groups

in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, and the inefficiency and incapacity of government economic policy.

The different patterns of capitalist development in the two countries, however, cannot be explained adequately without taking into consideration the differences in their colonial experiences. In this study we compare agrarian class relations and the agricultural transformation in Korea and the Philippines during the colonial period. Also, this study examines how the external influences (in the form of the socio-economic policy of the colonial state) of two different colonialisms acted differently upon the internal structural changes in both countries. Finally, this work will interpret the impact of these internal colonial social structures upon the post-colonial development of industrial capitalism.

Many social theorists have recently emphasized the role of agriculture and rural structural change in the development of industrial capitalism. They identify several preconditions for industrial capitalist development: (1) the deterioration of the hegemony of the landed class and a concomitant ascendancy of urban bourgeoisie over agrarian interests (Mouzelis, 1976); (2) the dispossession of the peasantry of the lands and the formation of an urban industrial labor force (de Janvry, 1981); (3) the transfer of agricultural surplus to industry (Vergopoulos, 1978); (4) the creation of home markets in the countryside for industrial consumer goods (McMichael, 1977); and (5) the establishment of capitalistic class relations in the agricultural sector (de Janvry, 1980).

Others have suggested that national agricultural development and internal rural structural changes must be understood in the context of the global accumulation process and the external impact of international relations of production and consumption upon the national agrarian transformation (Freedmann, 1978; 1982; Friedmann and McMichael, 1989; McMichael, 1980; 1987; Wallerstein, 1974).

For example, in his study of the capital accumulation process of Australia in the mid-nineteenth century, McMichael (1980) shows that the impact of world-economic forces in the forms of the British capital and its state policy greatly shaped the local class relations (and the form of class conflict) of settler Australia and, in turn, influenced the path of its capitalist development. In a similar vein, in his study of Mexican agriculture, Sanderson (1986:6) argues that "the transformation of Mexican agriculture is a product of a systemic internationalization of capital in agriculture and the long-term creation of a new global division of labor." He adds that "the shape of agriculture in the Americas is, to some great extent, dictated at the international level, in sales, procurement, technological inputs, cropping, and processing agricultural raw materials" (Sanderson, 1985:46). The externalist position is particularly evident today among researchers examining the effects of global economic restructuring on national and regional economies.

The present study integrates both the internalist and externalist positions. As Roxborough (1979:26) remarks, "purely exogenously determined models of change are as inadequate as the purely endogenous models" (see also Cardoso and Faletto, 1979:xvi). Koo (1984:42) argues that the internal class structure, deeply rooted in local history, is primarily responsible for divergent patterns of development among nations, and this internal class structure should be approached "from two angles, from the internal historical perspective and the world system perspective, because the present class structure is a joint product of the two forces."

American Colonial Policy in the Philippines

The half century of American colonial rule in the Philippine Islands is characterized by

the wide latitude of political autonomy by local Filipinos and the preferential "free-trade" relations between the colony and the US. The prominent feature of American colonial policy was an emphasis on self-government and local autonomy of the colonial people. The US emphasis on the concessions of political participation and the progressive transfer of political power to Filipino political elites can be attributed to basically two factors. America's Philippine policy was based on the anti-retentionist principle. Second, the political aspirations of the indigenous Filipino elites for self-government was so high as to significantly affect the overall framework of US colonial policy.

America's acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 was not part of a well-conceived plan, but a contingent and even an unwelcome consequence of the Spanish-American War (Fieldhouse, 1966; Halle, 1985). The US had not prepared for its colonial rule over the Philippines before the war broke out, and even after its occupation of the Islands the US government was divided internally over its Philippine policy. In the first decade of American colonial rule in the Philippines a policy debate on what to do with the new colony developed within the US government between two opposing camps. The retentionists saw the Philippines as a base from which to extend US influence and commerce in the Far East, and especially to China, and asserted that the Philippine Islands should be kept under the US sovereignty permanently. Anti-retentionists opposed direct involvement in the colony. From the second decade of its colonial rule, the anti-retentionists gained ascendancy in American foreign policy-making (Jenkins, 1954:31-33). Instead of retaining the Islands for an undesirably long period, the US decided to grant the Philippines full independence in due course. In the meantime, during the transitional period before the full political independence, it

was decided that the Filipino people should be allowed more opportunities for political participation and self-government.

It was necessary for American policymakers to recognize the political aspirations of the upper-class Filipino elites because their collaboration was essential to the successful colonial management of the Philippine Islands. Toward the end of the Spanish rule, the aspiration of the indigenous political elites for self-government and, ultimately, for complete political independence, had reached its highest point. Armed revolts erupted against the Spanish authorities during the last years of the nineteenth century and, again later, against the newly arriving American colonials. The Filipino revolt against the Americans was led by the upper-class Filipino landed elites. Faced with this challenge, American policymakers sought to draw them into American colonial rule as quickly as possible and to win back their confidence. After the Filipino resistance had been subdued by the American forces in 1899, it became the urgent task of the American colonial government to meet the political aspirations of the Filipino upper-class elites.

The American policy toward Filipino self-government was prominent in the second decade of the colonial rule under Governor-General Harrison (1913-1921), which was known as the "Filipinization" era. In 1916, the Philippine Commission, which was composed of both Americans and Filipinos and had until then worked as the chief executive and upper legislative body, was abolished in accordance with the Jones Law. Its legislative functions were taken over by the newly-created Senate, which was popularly elected and consisted wholly of Filipino elites. The National Assembly, the lower house of the legislature created in 1907, had also been composed exclusively of Filipino members. In the central colonial administration, many ranking American officials were replaced by Filipinos and low-

level administrative positions were also gradually filled by the colonial people. During the Harrison regime the number of Americans in the colonial administration declined from 2,623 to 614, the proportion of Americans to total officials declining from 29 percent to 4 percent (Hayden, 1942:96-97).

Filipino self-government was more extensive and developed more rapidly at the local level than at the national level. From the outset of the American colonial rule, the municipal government's officials were elected by popular vote (Barrows, 1914; Friend, 1965; Grossholtz, 1964). The provincial governments also were by and large controlled by the local Filipino political elites. The provincial governor had, from the beginning, always been a Filipino. He was elected every two years by the municipal councilors of the province, and from 1907, by popular vote (Hayden, 1942:261-89). The American colonial policy of "Filipinization" culminated in the establishment of the Commonwealth government in 1936. From that time on, until the full political independence in 1946, the indigenous Filipino elites exercised practically total control over their own political institutions and policy-making processes;

The essence of the economic relationship between the US and the Philippines during the half century of colonial rule was the "free trade" or "preferential trade" policy of the US government. It was designed to facilitate the provision of primary agricultural products and raw materials for American consumers in stable and favorable terms and to develop the colony as a market for US manufactured consumer goods. This free trade regime was initiated by the US Tariff Act of 1909 (known as Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act) and the parallel Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, and was enhanced by the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913 (Golay, 1983; Jenkins, 1954). They were the foundation of the mutual duty-free

trade between the Philippines and the US in the prewar era.

Agrarian Elites in the Colonial Philippines

A prominent feature of Philippine society under the American colonial regime was the dominance and virtual monopoly of the local landed elites in both municipal and provincial politics and government. It was large landlords, merchants and processors of agricultural products, money-lenders, and their professional associates, whose economic interests were vested in land ownership and agricultural undertakings, that exercised practically total monopoly over local politics and government. And, local politics and governments were what affected most the indigenous people in the countryside (Hayden, 1942:261-89; Lande, 1965).

The local agrarian elites' dominance of local politics and government can be traced to the Spanish colonial regime. Under the Spanish regime, the prominent members of the local landed class, called *principales*, monopolized the municipal politics and government, filling every post of municipal mayor or *gobernadorcillo* (Larkin, 1982; Pelzer, 1945; Phelan, 1959). When the American colonials replaced the Spaniards and their policy of local autonomy and self-government was instituted, the members of this *principalia*, owing to the restrictions on the franchise and their dominance over the peasantry, were able to retain their control over local politics and government. As Hayden (1942:261) notes, every barrio (village), municipality and province became the arena in which prominent local political leaders and families fought for power, and practically every voter became a partisan of one or the other faction of the leading landed elites.

Municipal governments under American

colonialism consisted usually of the mayor (called the *presidente*), the vice mayor, the municipal council, the secretary, and the treasurer. The mayor, the vice mayor and the council members were elected directly every two years by the voters under a limited franchise (Hayden, 1942:267, 285). All positions in the municipal government were monopolized by the local landed elites and their family members. Provincial governments were also dominated by the members of the ruling landed class in the province. They were the large landlords, who owned big estates that were scattered across the province and extended over a number of municipalities. They were often called *local barons* and known nationwide.

The dominance of agrarian elites in local politics and government was in one way secured by the restrictions of the franchise. The property and literacy qualifications for voting made the electorate to comprise only a small number of local elites (Grossholtz, 1964; Hayden, 1942). According to Hayden (1942:267), the legitimate voters in the local elections during the early colonial years was only about two percent of total inhabitants. Although the restrictions were gradually relaxed and the suffrage was broadened in the following decades, the proportion of the qualified voters to total population seldom exceeded one-tenth of total population (Landé, 1965:28-29).

The municipal and provincial politics and local political elites were the building blocks of the national politics and political parties (Landé, 1965). National political leaders were recruited from the pool of local agrarian-based political elites. With regard to the dominance of the landed elites and their legal associate professionals in the National Assembly, Sturtevant (1976:49) reports that "in 1923 only eight of ninety-three members in the House of Representatives were not classed as

landowners or lawyers, [while] in 1938 the ratio in the National Assembly was sixteen out of ninety-eight" (citing from Stephens, 1950:149). Most of the members of the National Assembly, and later, of the Senate and the House had formerly held the offices of provincial governors, municipal mayors, or sat on provincial boards (Hayden, 1942:284, 287). The principal feature of the Philippine political party system also was the fact that power in the parties was widely dispersed and remained in the hands of local landed elites and their political factions, who were almost wholly independent of the national party hierarchy (Landé, 1965:1-24).

Development of Commercial Agriculture in the Philippines

The political dominance of the Philippine agrarian elites and the US colonial policy of free trade led to the development of export-oriented commercial agriculture in the Philippines during the American period. This development helped Filipino agrarian elites to retain and reinforce their economic privileges and socio-political power, which impeded the industrial development in colonial Philippines.

The free-trade regime between the Philippines and the US was a direct result of the foreign trade policy of the US government, but to a large extent it also can be credited to the enthusiastic support of this policy by Filipino agrarian elites in national politics. From the beginning of the American rule, the indigenous agrarian elites favored the free-trade relations with the US and sought to promote commercial agriculture. Although the indigenous Philippine elites had strongly advocated the political independence of their country, it had always been held as a lower priority than the maintenance and promotion of their own economic interests.

Free-trade relations with the US--allowing

Philippine agricultural products to enter the US market duty-free--"gave a strong impetus to an export trade in selected agricultural products" (Wernstedt and Spencer, 1967:181). Within less than half a century, coconut exports skyrocketed fiftyfold and sugar exports increased eightfold, while the exports of abaca and tobacco doubled (Census of the Philippines, 1903; Jenkins, 1954:172; Legarda, 1955:197-222; Owen, 1971, 1984). The US policy of free trade and the consequent expansion of agricultural exports produced a favorable climate for the development of commercial agriculture for most crops in the Philippine archipelago. Increasing demand in the world market prompted a rapid expansion in the cultivation of such export crops as coconut, sugar, abaca and tobacco. These four crops accounted for approximately 90 percent of total export value through the entire American period. As a result, "[s]ugar, copra and abaca yields rose almost geometrically in an effort to meet the American market's seemingly insatiable demands" (Sturtevant, 1976:50). Sugar production, for example, increased from 135,000 metric tons in 1920 to 1,450,000 metric tons in 1934 (Sturtevant, 1976:50).

Another chief characteristic of Philippine agriculture was regional specialization of agricultural production. Sugar was produced in the Western Visayas, abaca in the Bikol Peninsula, tobacco in the Cagayan Valley, rice and sugar in Tagalog provinces and Pampanga, and rice in the Central Luzon Plain. The regional specialization of agricultural production was also one of the factors behind the strength of regionally-based agrarian elites. As McCoy (1982:8) demonstrates, this regionalization of the Philippine agrarian economy, functioning as strong centrifugal forces, "developed a series of distinct regional elites with divergent, if not conflicting, economic interests." These regional elites had been working against the formation of a strong nation state in the

Philippines.

In sum, during the American colonial period, the Philippine agrarian elites continued to dominate local politics and government and rural class relations. They utilized the US colonial policy which allowed the colonized much latitude in political participation and self-government to consolidate and reinforce their political hegemony. As a result, they were able to expand their influence from municipal and provincial politics to national politics. By employing their increased political hegemony, the Filipino agrarian elites managed to buttress the free-trade regime operated with the US Preferential trade, prompting agricultural exports, enabled them to augment their economic positions. The free-trade regime allowed the free entry of US manufactured consumer goods into the Philippines, significantly retarding the development of any indigenous import-substitution manufacturing industry.

The Japanese Colonial State in Korea

Japanese colonialism can be distinguished from that of the Western colonial powers in several aspects. Japan initiated its colonization campaign much later than did the Western colonial powers. The relative lateness of the Japanese colonial experience led to a distinctive feature of Japanese colonialism--the proximity of its colonies. The lateness of Japan's colonialism did not allow it to colonize far-distant territories, and left it only its neighbors in Northeast Asia (Cumings, 1981:7-8; 1984a; 1984b; Peattie, 1984). The territorial contiguity of the Japanese empire facilitated "a close, tight integration of colony to metropole" (Cumings, 1984a:10). From the inception of their colonial adventure, the Japanese colonials started their aggression against Korea with a view to incorporating Korean peninsula fully into their territory,

rather than operating it as their overseas colony (Peattie, 1984; see also Nakamura, 1974:350). A total integration of Korea and its economy into the metropole made necessary a strong colonial state in Korea (Cumings, 1984b).

The strength of the colonial state in Korea can also be attributed to the strength of the Japanese state at home (Cumings, 1981:8-12; Peattie, 1984). The Japanese state during the late nineteenth century can best be characterized by the term *étatisme*--the superiority of the state over the civil society. The state-centered tradition of the Japanese state was a feature of the Meiji reformatory rule (Peattie, 1984:23-24). Later, the same attitude, strategies, and framework used by the early Meiji leaders in their own state-building were applied to Japan's colonial state in Korea.

The Japanese colonial state in Korea had a well-organized and powerful state bureaucracy, with the governor-general at the top of its hierarchy (see Cumings, 1981:xxii; Government-General of Chosen, 1938; Grajdanzev, 1944). It was extremely centralized, with the power concentrated on the central government-general in Seoul. The governor-general possessed immense power, including legislative and, to a certain extent, judicial power. He was authorized to issue decrees, statutes, and regulations which affected every aspect of the life of the colonial populace. He could appoint judges and imprison anyone for as long as one year without trial. He also directly supervised all provincial and municipal governments. They were not local governments in a strict sense of the term, but only the local branch offices of the central government-general. The governor-general appointed all the governors of thirteen provinces, the district magistrates, and the municipal mayors. The almost unlimited administrative power of the governor-general led one contemporary observer to note that "in Korea the Governor-

General is virtually an absolute monarch" (Grajdanzev, 1944:238).

In sharp contrast to the American colonial state in the Philippines, the Japanese colonial state apparatus, both central and local, was completely monopolized by the Japanese colonizers. Japanese occupied all important positions of the central government-general. Koreans were allowed to occupy only minor positions, such as clerks and secretaries (see e.g. Chosen Nenkan, 1941, cited in Grajdanzev, 1944:60, 243). The Japanese also dominated all the provincial governorships and other lower-ranking posts in the provincial and municipal administrations (Grajdanzev, 1944:46-60, 247-48).

In contrast to the Filipino people under American colonialism, the indigenous population of Korea were not granted the right of suffrage, nor the right to participate in the political decisions--neither in the form of central legislature nor in the form of local self-government. If any such mechanisms for popular representation existed in colonial Korea, they were mere formalities and propagandistic arrangements. Upon the annexation of Korea, the Japanese colonial government created *Chusuin* or Central Council, an advisory body to the governor-general composed of some prominent members of the old Korean government and Korean industrialists or bankers closely connected with the Japanese businesses. But, unlike the Philippine Assembly under the American regime, it was merely a cosmetic organ. It did "not possess an iota of real authority" and there was "not one member in it who can be considered a representative of popular Korean interests." All the council members were chosen by the governor-general and consulted mainly on "matters of customs and beliefs" (Grajdanzev, 1944:46, 244-49).

Japanese Colonial Policy and the Korean Economy

Through its annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910, Japan established a vast

colonial empire in East Asia that stretched from Karafuto (South Sakhalin) to Formosa. The use of these colonies as an economic hinterland produced an impetus to Japanese industrialization, which had already "taken off" during the last decade of the nineteenth century. As Japan rapidly expanded its urban industrial sector, the demand of its urbanized population for wage goods increased. Concurrently, the role of its colonies grew as source of agricultural foodstuffs and as a market for Japan's industrial goods (Ho, 1984:348-50; Peattie, 1984; Suh, 1978:7-8).

The First Colonial Period (1910-1920)

Japanese colonial policy during the first decade of the colonial regime was directed towards laying firm bases--socio-economic as well as political--for colonial rule. Immediately following the annexation of Korea, Japan succeeded in building a strong state bureaucracy and firmly grounded its political ruling system. With this highly articulated political and administrative apparatus as its operational machine, the Japanese colonial state implemented a number of socio-economic reform policies: various institutional reforms, construction of economic infrastructures, and the cadastral survey.

The monetary system was reformed and integrated into the Japanese system, and Japanese currency was gradually substituted for Korean money. A modern banking system was introduced and many branch offices of Japanese banks were established nationwide. The fiscal system was also transformed; tax payments of cash took the place of payments in kind (Government-General of Chosen, 1921; Suh, 1978:5). This set of reform policies was intended to provide the necessary conditions for the total integration of the Korean economy into Japan's, inserting Korea into the orbit of the Japanese imperialist economic system. It facilitated the trade between

the colony and the metropole, which had already been swelling rapidly since the Kanghai Treaty in 1876. Korea was gradually changed from a natural economy to an exchange economy; its market economy expanded and its exchange relations grew.

Of critical importance to the Japanese colonial government was the cadastral survey undertaken from 1910 to 1918. Allegedly, this survey was conducted to determine the formal ownership status, size, and value of all land in the colony so as to establish a modern private land ownership system and to secure accurate data on agricultural production. The underlying intent, however, was to establish a stable rice supply base for the metropole, to enable Japanese individual settlers and corporations to acquire agricultural land in Korea, and to expand the state revenue base through better taxation (Lee, 1936:102, 105; Suh, 1978:16).

The cadastral survey had far-reaching consequences. It dispossessed many Korean landowners--both small owner-cultivators and large landlords--of the land their ancestors had tilled for centuries. They lost their farms simply because they failed to register their lands. Their land was then taken over by the colonial government. The land survey discovered large areas of land with unclear title of ownership. It was also confiscated by the colonial state, together with all the village common land and forests and the royal lands (Hamilton, 1986; Kim and Roemer, 1979; Lee, 1936). As a consequence, about 358 thousand *cho* (1 *cho* = 0.99 hectares = 2.45 acres) of arable land, which accounted for over 14.5 percent of the total arable land in Korea, and 9,256 thousand *cho* of forest land--58 percent of the total forest area--were taken by the colonial government (Government-General of Chosen, 1921:106; Kim and Roemer, 1979:3). Most of the land seized in this manner by the colonial government was gradually sold to Japanese settlers and corporations including

the Oriental Development Company at low prices.

The Second Colonial Period (1921-1930)

World War I produced an unprecedented industrial boom in Japan. Industrial expansion during the war years, coupled with a rapid increase in population and a slower growth of agricultural production, reinforced the already strong demand for agricultural foodstuffs. Agricultural prices rose sharply as rice shortages developed, which led to the Rice Riot of 1918 in major Japanese cities. Thus, Japan looked increasingly to her colonies for production of food grains; the role of Korea as an "agricultural appendage of Japan" was reinforced. Rapid capital accumulation during the war boom left Japan with a capital surplus, compelling Japan to seek an outlet for its abundant capital (Ho, 1984:349-50; Suh, 1978:11).

The changes that occurred in the late 1910s prompted the Japanese colonial government in Korea to reformulate its economic policy in the colony during the 1920s. It carefully accommodated its policies to the changing conditions of the world economy and to the changing political and economic needs of Japan. The acute rice shortage in Japan led the colonial government to increase agricultural production and exports in the colony (Amsden, 1989:53; Duus, 1984; Grajdanzev, 1944:92). Its industrial policy also underwent major changes. Among the most important changes was the removal of restrictions on industrial investment. The repeal of the Corporation Law in 1920 allowed Japanese capital to flow rapidly into the colony (Hamilton, 1986:14; Hatada, 1969:18; Suh, 1978:11-12).

From 1920 on, the colonial government launched a variety of programs for increasing rice production, such as large-scale land reclamation projects, a nationwide organization of irrigation associations, improvements in ir-

rigation and farming methods, and financial subsidies and technical assistance to farmers. It instituted the "land amelioration project," under which large-scale land reclamation and irrigation programs were conducted. Landlords and farmers were mobilized and organized into "irrigation associations" across the nation. These associations were given financial subsidies by the government and government-controlled banks. The government encouraged and often forced, when necessary, Korean farmers and landlords to adopt modern farming practices, such as improved cultivation methods, intensive application of manures and fertilizers, increased planting of new varieties of rice seeds, and up-to-date farm improvements (Lee, 1936:57-58, 118-31). In implementing these policies, the Japanese government-general fully utilized its far-reaching state machinery (police force, agricultural extension services, and local administrative network). The colonial government did not hesitate to employ coercive means to improve rice production (Lee, 1936:129). Korean farmers and landlords alike were forced to expend painstaking efforts on agricultural production, especially rice production.

As a result of the vigorous "agriculture drive," rice yields increased steadily during the period. The annual volume of rice production increased from an average yield of 11 million *koku* during 1910-12 to an average yield of 16.3 million *koku* during 1929-31 (compiled from data given in Grajdanzev [1944:295-97] and Suh [1978:20, 188]). Exports of agricultural foodstuffs (mostly rice) expanded tremendously during the 1920s, along with the exports of other primary goods (industrial raw materials). The value of total agricultural crops exported rose from a mere 9 million yen in 1915, to over 114 million yen in 1920, and to around 222 million yen in 1925 (Park, 1991:161; see also Suh, 1978:178). The proportion of rice exports to total rice yield also

increased remarkably. In the first decade of colonization, less than one-tenth of the total rice yield was exported to Japan, whereas at the end of the second decade almost half the nation's total rice yield crossed the Korea Strait (Park, 1991:162).

The abolition of the Corporation Law in 1920 provided a positive environment for the development of industry. Many Japanese industrialists opened factories in Korea, but they were only "small scale industries working on local raw materials" such as canned goods, sugar, silk, and the distilling and brewing of alcoholic beverages (Takahashi, 1935:349-50; quoted in Grajdanzev, 1944:69). Even this limited industrial development was slanted toward the Japanese. Old handicraft and cottage industries, mostly operated by indigenous Koreans, were "swept away" by the introduction of the modern Japanese factory system. Korean manufacturers could not compete with Japanese manufacturers, which were assisted by the government in terms of regulations and financial subsidies. Japanese-controlled financial institutions made loans almost exclusively to Japanese firms. In 1928, Japanese manufacturing enterprises controlled 92.5 percent of the total capital investment in the manufacturing sector and employed two-thirds of the total manufacturing industry employees (Lee, 1936:31-35).

Japanese colonial policy encouraged agricultural production and rice exports, the dominance of industry by the Japanese, and the discrimination against Korean entrepreneurs. During the first two decades under the Japanese regime, the Korean landlords and farmers were goaded into making every effort to expand agricultural production. However, the falling price of rice during the latter half of the 1920s placed the Korean farming population in an awkward position. The price of rice dropped from over 30 yen per *koku* in 1922 to 16.2 yen per *koku* nine years later. The falling

price of rice deepened the indebtedness of farmers and reduced the profits of landlords and farmers (Hishimoto, 1938, cited by Grajdanzev, 1944:293; Lee, 1936:127-29).

The sudden change in the colonial economic policy further aggravated this situation. Toward the end of the 1920s, Japan began to suffer from the overproduction of rice in her colonies—in Korea and Formosa. Japanese farmers, who had been agitated by the flooding of Formosan and Korean rice, put strong pressure on the Japanese government. Thus, at the beginning of the 1930s, the government-general in Korea canceled all plans for increasing rice production in Korea and shifted its policy focus to industrial development (Grajdanzev, 1944:92-93; Lee, 1936:131). This presented a serious blow to the rural economy in Korea. Korean landlords, as well as peasant farmers, were greatly damaged by this abrupt policy change.

The Third Colonial Period (1931-1945)

The world-wide economic depression which had begun in 1929 struck the Japanese economy hard. High protectionist barriers throughout the world prompted Japan to abandon its free trade policies of the 1920s and to pursue the establishment of a self-sufficient economy within the empire. Economic self-sufficiency required a diversification of its industries at home (and a build-up of heavy industries such as steel, chemicals, and armaments); their relocation to the colonies (thus, a new division of labor within the empire, between the colonies and the metropole); and development of industrial raw materials in the colonies to diminish reliance on imports from outside the Yen Bloc (Cumings, 1984a:12; 1984b:488-89; Hamilton, 1986:13; Ho, 1984; Suh, 1978:12). With the emergence of protectionism, Japan changed its state policy from liberalism to authoritarian militarism. The defense strategy of Japan was tied to its offensive

territorial expansion in the form of "concentric circles radiating from the home islands" (Peattie, 1984:8). Japan launched a series of military campaigns in the early 1930s. In 1932, following deliberate military provocations in the previous year, the vast area of Manchuria was taken by the Japanese and a puppet government of "Manchukuo" was set up. This incident prompted Japanese re-militarization, and leading militarists again took command of the Japanese government (Han, 1970:493; Suh, 1978:12).

Incorporation of Manchuria into the Japanese empire made Korea strategically important. Korea, located between Japan and Manchuria, was an ideal place for Japan's industrial relocation project, with Manchuria supplying both food staples and abundant industrial raw materials for Korean industry. Korea increasingly played a semi-peripheral role between the peripheral Manchuria and the core Japan in the 1930s (Cumings, 1984a). Moreover, Korea was also rich in mineral resources, hydroelectric power, and cheap labor (Peattie, 1984:33; Suh, 1978:13).

Thus, from the early 1930s Korea was forced to provide industrial producer goods (intermediate products such as petro-chemicals and metals) for Japan's heavy industry (especially the munitions industry). It also had to accommodate the over-developed industry of Japan in order to ease the tensions of the metropolitan economy. Massive state investments and financial subsidies were expended in a strong industrialization drive, especially in war-related heavy and chemical industries. The colonial government also used favorable government regulations, tax preferences, and other administrative support to encourage Japanese capitalists to invest in the colony. It also fostered the development of electric power and mineral resources which were necessary for industrial development. Moreover, the colonial government itself took part in the in-

dustrialization drive through semi-statal enterprises and government monopolies (Chang, 1971:76-77; Ho, 1984; Peattie, 1984).

In 1937, Japan's continuous penetration of China since the Manchurian incident culminated in a full-scale war, the Sino-Japanese War. Growing military needs required the rapid expansion of heavy and chemical industries in the colony as well as in the metropole. Korea was pressed hard to play the role of an "economic supply base for the military adventures on the continent" (*Tairiku heitan kichi*) (Grajdanzev, 1944:135; Suh, 1978:12-13). The colonial government doubled its efforts to promote heavy and chemical industry in Korea in order to provide military supplies for the Japanese armies in China. The trends toward war-related heavy and chemical industrial development continued until the end of the colonial period.

Backed up by the colonial state policies, manufacturing and mining industries in Korea experienced a significant growth during the 1930s. The total net value added in manufacturing production (at 1936 constant prices) rose two-and-a-half times, from an average of 127 million yen during 1929-31 to an average of 319 million yen in 1938-40 (Suh, 1978:171). The number of modern manufacturing factories and of industrial employees increased rapidly during this period. Industrial employment rose from less than 100,000 persons before 1930 to about 270,000 persons by the end of 1930s and to 550,000 persons in 1943 (Park, 1991:176).

Changes in the manufacturing sector, however, occurred not as a consequence of an autonomous and indigenous development of domestic industrial capital. Rather, these changes were externally imposed to meet the requirements of Japanese imperialist development and war preparation. As a result, Japanese interests held a monopolistic position in the colonial industry. Large-scale factories in

war-related heavy and chemical industries dominated colonial economy¹ and they were mostly the subsidiaries of the famous Japanese *zaibatsu* concerns, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda, and Noguchi (Grajdanzev, 1944:152; Lim, 1985:41). The indigenous Korean entrepreneurs were largely excluded from heavy and chemical industries and restricted to small-scale light industries. All Korean-owned enterprises were small in scale and weak in capital formation.² They were excluded from financial subsidies (either from the colonial government or from the Japanese-controlled financial institutions) and administrative support. Also, the colonial government, which controlled the supply of raw materials and intermediate producer goods, discriminated against Korean manufacturers in their supply (Grajdanzev, 1944:148-84; Hamilton, 1986:14-15). Many small and medium-scale Korean enterprises, "faced by a shortage of intermediate goods and by the government controls on production in the early 1940s, were forced to close" (Kim and Roemer, 1979:6).

The industrial development during the third period also had one significant implication. It contributed to the formation of the industrial work force. The urbanization and industrialization during the 1930s and the early 1940s provided employment opportunities for the landless rural laborers and poor peasants, enticing potential industrial workers from the countryside. In conjunction with the dwindling personal dependency ties between the landlords and peasant farmers in the rural sector, urban and industrial development in this period contributed greatly to the gradual disintegration of existing rural social relations. These changes led to the massive rural out-migration in the later years of the colonial period and ultimately to the formation of an industrial working class (see Mason et al., 1980:74-82).

In conclusion, during the Japanese period, the indigenous Korean landlords were unable to exercise any significant amount of political influence and were not allowed to participate in colonial administration and political processes. Their political weakness is in sharp contrast to the strength of Filipino agrarian elites. In addition to their political incapacity, they were economically weak. It was not the indigenous Korean landed class but the Japanese landlords and agricultural corporations that controlled colonial agriculture in Korea. Japanese landlords were in a much more advantageous position with regard to the capital than were the indigenous landlords. They were readily supported by the colonial government and by the Japanese-controlled banks. Korean landlords had "less capital and thus, in general, less land and smaller capital investments in their land" (Cumings, 1981:47). Japanese dominance over the agricultural land was especially prominent in large-scale farms (Park, 1991:204).

The colonial policy changes in the 1930s and the early 1940s that emphasized industrial development and war-related mobilization of economic and human resources in the rural sector prompted a handful of Korean landlords to divert agricultural surpluses and invest them in commerce and light industries. The transfer of indigenous agricultural capital to the commercial and industrial capital, and the conversion of some local landlords to industrial and merchant capitalists would help them prolong their economic positions and retain their economic interests. The long-term effect of these personal metamorphoses, however, was to further reduce the power base of the Korean landed class in general. Moreover, those landlord-turned-industrialists could not survive in the discriminatory environment of the colonial industrial development.³

Korea and the Philippines in the Postwar Era

Different patterns of structural transformation in colonial agriculture in the Philippines and Korea--differences in terms of the landed class hegemony and the formation of free-labor (the potential industrial workforce)--brought about different consequences in postwar industrial development. In the Philippines, the hegemony of the prewar agrarian elites was reinstated after World War II (after a short period of the Japanese occupation) and the new order was formulated upon the continuation of the status quo ante. In Korea, the landlords class failed to take any significant part in the newly created Republic.

Restoration of the prewar social and political order in the Philippines was undertaken at two different levels. In national politics, the prewar political oligarchy, which had represented enthusiastically the landed interests of the local agrarian elites during the American period, returned to power after the war with the help of the American military authorities. The American government sought to draw the postwar Philippine political leadership from the old oligarchy and wartime collaborators simply because it was unable to find elsewhere any politically capable groups who could lead the newly inaugurated Republic (Abaya, 1946; Shalom, 1981:1-32; Steinberg, 1967).

In a similar fashion, the old landlords in the countryside also regained their prewar socio-political hegemony. This feat was accomplished through the joint military campaign of the US military forces and the Philippine constabulary to suppress the insurgency elements in the countryside. The peasants in Central Luzon, who had become highly politicized by socialists during the 1930s, organized during the Japanese occupation an anti-Japanese guerrilla organization, called the *Hukbalahap* (or the *Huk* in short). It was founded in March 1942 with the purpose of (1)

resisting the Japanese and the Japanese-backed puppet regime; and (2) eliminating the landlord domination in the countryside. During the war years between 1941-1945, the Huk assumed control of the peasant farmers in Central Luzon through its wide mass base and its disciplined and determined political and military organizations. When the American forces and Philippine government troops returned after the war, they launched a series of massive anti-Huk campaigns in a joint military operation. The US did not intend to leave any room for the communist elements to gain political influence in the rural areas. Instead, the US chose to win the support of more conservative and cooperative regional landed elites by invigorating them. The Huk rebellion, which had gained significant influence in Central Luzon during the late 1940s and the early 1950s, was practically subdued by the mid-1950s. The pacification of the countryside enabled the old local landlords to return to their farmland and resume their dominance there.

In contrast to the Philippines, the political vacuum created by the flight of Japanese in August 1945 after their defeat in the Pacific War was not filled by the landed class. It was because its political power had been seriously deteriorated and its economic base shrunk significantly. Korean landlords were unable to politically mobilize and organize themselves at the time of liberation. Instead, together with the returned cadre of anti-Japanese independence movement leaders (e.g., Syngman Rhee) at the top of the state apparatus, the handful of Korean bureaucrats, policemen, and army officers who had served the Japanese colonizers came to play an increasingly significant role in Korean politics and administration under the American tutelage (1945-1948), ultimately filling the political vacuum left by Japanese. The establishment of new political order along this pattern was carried on under the consent and guidance of the US Military Government.

The lack of political power, on the other hand, cost the landlords class the implementation of land reform.⁴

Land Reform

Land reform in a number of East and Southeast Asian countries in the postwar era was implemented to increase agricultural productivity and farm income through land improvement, development and diffusion of new agricultural technology, new seeds, and new farming methods. More importantly, it was anticipated that equity in land ownership and in the distribution of agricultural surplus would be achieved through land redistribution programs, improvement in tenancy system and practice, and/or the establishment of owner-operators (see de Janvry, 1984; Dorner, 1972; Dorner and Kanel, 1979; Ghatak and Ingersent, 1984:217-27). The long-term consequence of land reform--the formation of "home market"--was also important. It was assumed that success in land reform would lead to an increase in rural farm income and the purchasing power of the rural sector, which would act as a strong demand for industrial consumer goods. Therefore, a successful land reform program was indispensable to the development of industrial capitalism in the newly independent countries.

In the Philippines, the resistance of the landed class and the unwillingness of the Philippine government--especially the legislature--blocked the success of agrarian reform programs. They were implemented not as part of fundamental socio-structural reform but as a "patch-up" measure to alleviate rural unrest and to resolve insurgency. Neither the US government nor the Philippine government intended to change fundamentally the basic social relations in the countryside. Using economic aid as an incentive, the US government pressured the Philippine government to initiate agrarian reform programs, which it felt were

necessary to the rehabilitation of the devastated Philippine economy. The Philippine government, however, was quite reluctant to play its part.

After the Huk rebellion had been put down and the intensity of rural grievances alleviated, the first serious attempt at the agrarian reform was proposed by the Magsaysay administration (1954-57). Its reform program had two objectives: (1) the improvement of existing tenancy system and practice; and (2) an extensive redistribution of farm land. But the Land Reform Act of 1955 itself was, due to the organized opposition by local landlords, little improvement over existing legislation. Under the pressure of local landed elites and the National Assembly, officials in the administration and in the reform agencies (e.g., Land Tenure Administration, the Court of Agrarian Relations) were reluctant to execute the program fully and often exerted their influence to block its implementation (Starnes, 1961:187). As Murray (1972:158) states, "Magsaysay was able to get a bill through Congress . . . but he was unable to implement it."

Another agrarian reform effort followed in the early 1960s. The Macapagal administration (1962-65) attempted to establish owner-operators and medium-sized family farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture. However, this reform effort was also a disappointment. The landlord-controlled Congress subjected the land reform bill proposed by the administration to two hundred amendments so that the new Land Reform Code (of 1963) became, like the 1955 Land Tenure Act, riddled with legal loopholes favorable to the landlords. Furthermore, both regional land reform committees and local land reform project teams, the institutional tools which were supposed to carry out the reform program, were practically under the control of local landed elites and operated so as to favor landlord interests. Thus, successive agrarian reform efforts in the Phil-

ippines during the 1950s and the early 1960s ended in failure. The stubborn resistance of local landed elites and their representatives in Congress, as well as the unwillingness of the Philippine government to implement the reform program, caused both efforts to fail.

In contrast, the success of the land reform program in Korea was due largely to the absence of any significant opposition. Landlords were opposed to it, but their influence upon the national government and legislature was minimal. The consensus both inside and outside of the government was that land reform was necessary, and the debate in the National Assembly only concerned the extent of the reform and the methods to be employed.

The role played by the US, either directly through the US Military Government (1945-48) or indirectly (after 1948), was also important for the success of Korean land reform. First of all, the US government strongly encouraged land reform to ease rural discontent and prevent any radical element from getting the upper hand in the countryside. Granting farmlands to the tillers was much to the purpose. Second, the establishment of small-scale owner-operators in Korean agriculture, by producing many active participants in the capitalist market economy as buyers of manufactured goods, well fit in with the US scheme to build a global capitalist economic regime in the postwar era operating around the US as its hub.

The core of the Korean land reform lies in its land redistribution program. The official land redistribution program of the Korean government was put into effect in April 1950. But, even before the formulation of government's reform program, a significant change had already taken place. In 1948, the US Military Government had sold over 243,000 hectares of confiscated farmland formerly owned by the Japanese landlords, mostly to the former Korean tenants of the land (Bank of

Korea, 1955). From 1945 to 1949 the fear of radical land reform (confiscation and redistribution of farmlands without compensation) and the rising tide of radicalism in the countryside forced many Korean landlords to sell privately their farms to the tenants. Thus, between the end of 1945 to June 1949, tenant farm households decreased from over one million to around a half million (total farm households in 1945 was 2,065,000) and land area tilled by tenants fell from 1,460,000 hectares to 820,000 hectares (total cultivated land area during the period was around two and a half million hectares) (Bank of Korea, 1948; 1956; MAF, 1970). In March 1950, the Land Reform Act was passed. By 1952, under this law, the Korean government purchased from the landlords 330,000 hectares of farmland and distributed them to the landless peasants (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1980:283-87).⁵

Land reform efforts in Korea during the late 1940s and the early 1950s were so extensive that they fundamentally changed the agricultural landscape of the countryside. They created a vast mass of small-scale owner-operated farms. By 1959, the number of tenant farm households declined to 43,000, a mere 2 percent of total farm households; the area of land tilled by tenants, to 155,000 hectares, less than 8 percent of total cultivated land (MAF, 1960). Thus, by the early 1960s a small-scale family farm system was firmly established in the countryside. Ninety-three percent of farm households owned farmlands smaller than two hectares (MAF, 1968). An important outcome of the successful land reform program was a remarkable increase in rural income. Per-household farm income (minus rent) was 40 percent higher in 1962 than in the 1930s; "about half this increase in income was due to increases in agricultural production per family, but the other half was caused by land reform" (Mason et al., 1980:239). As a secondary benefit, the existence of a rural sector com-

posed mostly of owner-operated family farms provided fertile ground for a nationwide rural income-generating drive during the 1970s. This drive, known as *Saemaul Undong* or the New Community Movement, greatly contributed to the creation of a stable "home market" in the rural sector for the domestic manufacturing industries.

Industrialization Efforts and Two Different Results

When the Philippines was liberated in 1945, the Philippine economy was devastated, characterized by high inflation, shortages of basic commodities, hunger, disease, and destruction. The same was true for the South Korean economy. The sudden departure of the Japanese led to a severe shortage of capital and managerial and technical personnel. After the partition of the Korean peninsula, South Korea was seriously disadvantaged in terms of industrial facilities and raw materials. Industrial facilities were heavily concentrated in the northern part of Korea, which was also richly endowed with minerals and other raw materials. However, more than anything else, the three years of Korean War totally destroyed the remaining urban industrial facilities and infrastructure and devastated the rural economy. Thus, the limited amount of industrial capital accumulated during the colonial period was not transferred to the postwar Korean economy.

In their attempts to overcome the devastation of war, both the Philippines and South Korea launched massive campaigns for industrial development. They endeavored to achieve economic development first through an import-substitution industrialization (ISI) policy, later shifting to export-oriented industrialization (EOI). The Philippines initiated its ISI drive in 1949 with the implementation of protectionist measures, while Korea started its ISI-oriented economic development pro-

gram in 1953. However, their industrializing efforts led to very different results.

Landed hegemony again acted as the main cause of the failure of the ISI policy in the Philippines. The Philippine landed class had always supported the export-oriented commercial agriculture, preferring a free-trade policy and the maintenance of an open-economy. The success of ISI, however, lies in its protectionist policy—in the implementation of such measures as import control and exchange control. Due mainly to pressure from landed interests, the Philippine government was forced to lift the control measures in 1962. The postwar free trade regime between the US and the Philippines, initiated by the Bell Trade Act of 1946, allowed surplus American manufactured goods to flood into the Philippines in the late 1940s. Imports from the US drained the Philippine economy of its foreign exchange reserves, creating a severe balance-of-payment problem (Constantino and Constantino, 1978:227; Golay, 1961:44, 112; Villegas, 1982:4). In 1949, fearing the collapse of the Philippine economy and the expansion of communism, the US government reluctantly allowed the Philippines to implement foreign exchange and import control policies. This protectionist measure encouraged the growth of a substantial degree of industrial development in the manufacturing industry. Local Filipino entrepreneurs started many new industrial undertakings, establishing more than 5,000 new enterprises during the first four years of the protectionist regime. Under the protectionist umbrella, they began to produce such industrial goods as textiles, cements, and fertilizer. The control measure, however, increasingly agitated the traditional export-oriented agrarian elites, as it greatly diminished their profits. They began to complain of the existing economic policy and exerted their influence upon the government. Pressure also came from the US government and the Ameri-

can business community in Manila. The US government, unwilling to endure the protectionist policy of the Philippine any longer, compelled the Philippine government to devalue the peso and to remove exchange control. In November, 1961, Diosdado Macapagal, an advocate of open economy and non-interventionist economic policy, won the presidential election, owing to the clandestine support of the US government and the open support of landed elites who financed his election campaign. The moment he assumed the office in January 1962, his administration lifted the exchange/import controls and returned to the open economy. As the protectionist wall was being removed and the Philippine peso was devalued, more and more domestic Filipino enterprises went bankrupt. Many local enterprises were swallowed up by foreign corporations or forced into joint ventures.

Korea's industrialization effort began in 1953, after the Korean War. The key objectives of government economic policy during the 1950s were to reconstruct the industrial facilities and infrastructure destroyed by the war and to stabilize commodity prices. Its industrial policy was based on ISI strategy. The government implemented various import control measures--high tariffs and quantitative import quota restrictions. These measures encouraged domestic industries, particularly consumer goods industries (Kim and Rocmer, 1979:40-78; Mason et al., 1980:92-164). In the mid-1960s, under President Park's regime (1961-79), government policy objectives changed from rehabilitation and stabilization to a rapid economic growth based on outward-looking EOI. From 1961 to 1975, the average annual growth rate of GNP at 1970 constant prices reached 9.6 percent, while the average growth rate of industrial value added was a remarkable 18.4 percent. The growth of exports has averaged more than 35 percent a

year in real terms since the 1960s (Mason et al., 1980:97-98).

Rapid industrialization of the Korean economy has been traced to such factors as a smooth flow of foreign capital, a highly educated and skilled labor force, effective and selective government intervention, and entrepreneurship. Korea was empowered with massive foreign capital, mostly from the US. Immediately after the Korean War, the US aid was poured into the Korean economy in the forms of reconstruction aid (from UNKRA), agricultural surplus aid (by Public Law 480 from 1956) and economic aid (from ICA in the late 1950s and AID in the 1960s). During the decade from 1953 to 1962, over 2.5 billion dollars of aid flowed into the country (Bank of Korea, 1965-67). They were transfused into the Korean economy through the Korean state as the allocator. It laid the base for the Korean state's dominance over the private economy and the state-led industrialization and export drive during the 1960s and 1970s.

Yet Korea's economic success also drew strength from the absence of hegemonic landed interests. The demolition of the old landed class, together with the establishment of small-scale land ownership in agriculture, allowed the Korean state a wide range of options in its economic policy. During the 1960s, the government had tight control over grain prices, especially those for rice and barley; they had been kept consistently low during the decade. In the absence of strong resistance from the agricultural sector, the government could import a large quantity of PL 480 grain from the US, and marketed the grain through government channels at a competitive price. Low grain prices and large imports of foreign grain helped the government to maintain the terms of trade favorable to urban industry, as well as to control inflation. The agricultural production and marketing sectors characterized by owner-operators and a high degree of

government control enabled the government to channel food staples to the urban industrial work force in sufficient quantity and in a stable manner (Ban, Moon, and Perkins, 1980:234-59; Brown, 1973:111-29).

Conclusions

This study examined the role of agrarian class relations in the industrial development of two East Asian countries--the Philippines and South Korea. The structural transformation in agriculture and rural class relations are critical to the development (or underdevelopment) of industrial capitalism. Barrington Moore (1966) was one of the first social scientists to point to the critical role of bourgeois hegemony, rural class relations, and the revolutionary potential of peasants as determining various paths or routes to development. Moore's approach, however, suffers from a focus on "exclusively intrasocietal change-producing processes" (Skocpol, 1973:12). Alternatively, theories of external determination examine how internal structural changes in agrarian sectors are shaped by external forces (Wallerstein, 1974).

Our comparative research on the divergent paths of development in the Philippines and South Korea points to the intricate relationship between external forces and agrarian class dynamics. The debate over the relative importance of external versus internal influences on agrarian relations is largely a historical one. Clearly, external forces set in motion structural changes in developing countries and influence the nature of class relations in rural areas. But at the same time, rural class relations have their own independent force that can sometimes shape external forces, as it did in the case of the Philippines. Agrarian class relations are the site where internal and external influences merge. Rather than identifying which set of influences is most important, it is

more useful to frame the problem as an historical one that leaves open the question of the role of class, state, and transnational relations on the agricultural system.

Notes

1. In 1939, large-scale factories with over 200 workers accounted for merely 1.2 percent of all manufacturing factories and yet produced 61.8 percent of total manufacturing products (Kawai 1943:252-53, cited in Suh 1978:109).
2. In 1938, Japanese-owned industrial "corporations" accounted for 87.7 percent of total capital of all industrial corporations, while constituting 52.1 percent in number. The capital of the average Japanese corporation was more than six times as large as that of the average Korean corporation--267,000 yen versus 41,000 yen (Choi 1971:286-89; Himeno 1940:330; see also Ainsden 1989:33; Grajdanzev 1944:171-76; Hamilton 1986:15).
3. Some researchers have argued that domestic industrialists of landed origin produced in the Japanese colonial period played a central role in the economic development of South Korea during the 1960s (Hamilton 1986; Jones and SaKong 1980; McNamara 1990). Recent studies (e.g., Suh 1988) show evidences against their argument. Kim Yon-su, a former big landlord who was successfully transformed into a textile manufacturer in the 1930s and became one of the major entrepreneurs in the 1960s (see the case study of McNamara 1988), was the only exception.
4. The Korean Democratic Party, formed by leading industrial capitalists whose capital was of landed origin (e.g., Kim Song-su) and their associates, was their last hope. However, under the authoritarian rule of Syngman Rhee (1948-60), this last bastion of landed interests became politically neutralized.
5. Due to the Korean War (1950-53), the implementation of land redistribution program was suspended for several months. But, immediately after Seoul was retaken by the Allied forces in September 1950, the program was resumed.

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Resumen

Transformación agraria y colonialismo: Un Estudio Histórico-Comparativo de Corea y Filipinas

Este estudio compara el desarrollo de Corea del Sur, caso relativamente exitoso en Asia oriental, con el subdesarrollo de Filipinas. Examinamos la dinámica interna de clase y las fuerzas económicas del mundo exterior que le dieron forma al desarrollo capitalista en Corea y Filipinas. El análisis comparativo revela que la transformación estructural de la agricultura y las relaciones entre clases rurales fueron claves para determinar los senderos divergentes de desarrollo de estos dos países asiáticos.

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